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INTRODUCTION 
Congress has aggressively banned activity involving child 
pornography and has issued numerous directives to the United 
States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") to increase 
punishment. As a result, prosecutions and sentences have risen 
t Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. My thanks to Bridget 
Crawford, Linda Fentiman, and John Furfaro for their comments and support. 
1013 
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dramatically.1 With the demise of mandatory sentencing,2 a 
growing number of district court judges have deviated downward 
from the sentencing guidelines ("Guidelines"), particularly in 
possession cases. The debate over the appropriate sentences for 
convicted child pornographers has also intensified among 
scholars, judges, legislators, and the general public. Either 
through judicial rejection of guideline suggestions or through 
direct action by the Commission, sentencing reform appears 
likely.3 However, the concentrated focus on sentencing overlooks 
a vital, broader inquiry into the offenses themselves and the 
changes technology has wrought in how they are committed. 
This Article seeks to fill this gap and provide a framework 
for a normative evaluation of the offenses and their sentences. It 
contends that laws enacted to address physical world issues of 
child pornography dissemination are obsolete in the virtual 
world. It was clear in the late 1970s, when investigative 
reporters first exposed the child pornography market, which 
actors fell into the categories of transporters, distributors, and 
receivers.4 For example, in the past, Suspect Sam would get 
child pornography from a smut peddler and Suspect Sam's 
possession of it would not even be a crime.5 Today, Suspect Sam 
most likely gets his child pornography from his home computer 
1 TROY STABENOW, DE CONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL STUDY: A PRIMER 
ON THE FLAWED PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 2-3 
(2009), available at http://www.fd.orgidocs/Select-Topics---sentencingichild-porn-july-
revision.pdf. For example, for one defendant who distributed five images of a child 
under the age of twelve, the 1987 Guideline range was 12 to 18 months; however, by 
2004, the Guideline range was 188 to 235 months. [d. at 27-28. See infra Part LD 
for a discussion of the impact of this report. 
2 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-60 (2005). 
3 The Sentencing Commission recently completed a multiyear review of the 
child pornography Guidelines that was prompted in large part by changing 
technology, increased prosecutions, and sentiment that the sentencing scheme was 
overly harsh. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEDERAL 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES i-iii (2012) [hereinafter 2012 COMMISSION 
REPORT), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/pdflnews/congressional-
testimony-and-reports/sex -offense-topics/20 1212-federal-child -pornography-offensesl 
Full_Report_to_Congress.pdf; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE HISTORY OF 
THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 54 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 COMMISSION 
REPORT), available at http://www.ussc.govlResearch_and_StatisticslResearch_ 
Projects/Sex_ Offenses/20091030 _History _Child_Pornography _Guidelines. pdf. 
4 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY: 
FINAL REPORT 599-603 (1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT). 
5 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1990) (noting that only nineteen 
states had banned possession of child pornography in 1990). 
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and, by downloading images, he both receives and possesses the 
images. Current law dictates that Suspect Sam gets a minimum 
sentence of five years for receiving the images, and up to ten 
years for possessing them-with no mandatory minimum for the 
possession.6 In addition, simply because he used a computer to 
commit the offenses, Suspect Sam's sentence would be increased.7 
To further illustrate the impact of technology, if Suspect Sam 
downloaded the images from a peer-to-peer application and 
stored them in a shared online folder, in addition to the receiving 
and possessing charges, he could also be charged with 
distributing the images.s These redundancies are not merely 
sentencing issues; more essentially, there is an overlap in 
charges since the very same action gives rise to multiple offenses. 
The once-clear divisions between distribution, transportation, 
and receipt are blurred in cyberspace. Thus, examining the child 
pornography statutes is a requisite to addressing current 
sentencing controversies. Meaningful scrutiny must be grounded 
in the rationale for the ban on child pornography-the harm to 
the children depicted. 
This Article traces the history of the child pornography laws 
and sentencing policy in Part I. Part II explains the technologies 
that have caused some of the current controversies, and then 
Part III describes how these technologies have blurred the 
offenses. Finally, Part IV makes suggestions as to how the law 
could better reflect technology and comport with a refined harm 
rationale. Courts, legal scholars, and medical experts have 
explained the harm includes the sexual abuse captured in the 
images and the psychological injury the victim endures knowing 
the images are being viewed. This Article further develops the 
harm rationale by explaining that the harm rests on a 
fundamental injury to the victim's human dignity and privacy. 
Drawing on comparisons to diverse laws such as the Geneva 
Convention's ban on photographs of prisoners of war, this Article 
states that all traders in child pornography violate the rights of 
the children depicted, and therefore, inflict harm, albeit at 
different levels. This Article suggests that a statutory scheme 
that divides pornographers into three groups-producers, 
traders, and seekers-would best reflect how technology has 
6 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2012). 
7 See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
S See infra notes 153, 155 and accompanying text. 
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changed the manner in which pornography is gathered and 
spread. Sentences could be calibrated accordingly to punish for 
the harm inflicted by the pornographers. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Current Law 
Federal laws enacted to protect children from child 
pornographers can be divided into two main categories: First, 
Congress has enacted a stringent ban on producing child 
pornography, with a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen 
years.9 Second, Congress has banned all aspects relating to the 
trafficking of child pornography, including transporting, 
distributing, receiving, possessing, accessing, soliciting, or 
advertising child pornography.lO Congress has mandated 
minimum five-year sentences for transporting, distributing, and 
receiving, while the other offenses have no minimum sentence.ll 
The following subsection provides a chronology of legislative and 
judicial action on pornography offenses, with complementary 
sentencing guidelines. The piecemeal and reactive development 
of the law demonstrates why deep structural changes are 
presently needed. 
B. Legislative and Judicial History 
Following an increased public awareness of the scourge of 
child pornography in the late 1970s, Congress passed the 
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.12 
The Act punished commercial producers,13 transporters, 
9 18 U.S.C. § 2251. 
10 [d. § 2252A. 
11 [d. § 2252A(b)(I)-(2). Attempts are punished the same as the completed 
offenses. [d. 
12 Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (2012)). See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 408-
15; EVA J. KLAIN ET AL., AM. BAR AsS'N CTR. ON CmLDREN & THE LAw, CmLD 
PORNOGRAPHY: THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE-SYSTEM RESPONSE 12 (2001). 
13 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 § 2, 
18 U.s.C. § 2251. The commercial purpose requisite stemmed from an erroneous 
assumption by Congress that pecuniary gain was the driving force behind the 
creation and trading of child pornography. See Annemarie J. Mazzone, Comment, 
United States v. Knox: Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation Through the 
Federal Child Pornography Laws, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 167, 
182-83 (1994). It became clear by the lack of successful prosecutions under the 1977 
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distributors, and receivers of obscene child pornography. 14 
During this same time period, states were also enacting their 
own bans on child pornography without the obscenity 
requirement. 15 This led to the 1982 landmark ruling in New York 
v. Ferber,16 in which the United States Supreme Court held that 
child pornography was not protected by the First Amendment 
even if it was not obscene because it was "intrinsically related to 
the sexual abuse of children."17 The Court reasoned that the 
materials produced were a permanent record of the child's 
participation and the harm to the child was exacerbated by their 
circulation.18 The Court recognized the dignitary harm inflicted 
by child pornographers, observing that they violate "the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."19 
Following Ferber, Congress amended the original federal 
child pornography legislation to remove the obscenity and 
commercial purpose requirements.2o Congressional hearings 
leading to the amendments found that much of the trade between 
child pornographers was by gift or exchange, so the commercial 
purpose requirement unnecessarily limited the reach of the law.21 
Thus, from very early on, Congress was aware purveyors of child 
pornography were motivated by more than money;22 this impulse 
has been greatly exacerbated by technology.23 
Act that the commercial purpose limitation was thwarting enforcement efforts. 
Moreover, future congressional investigation revealed that child pornography rings 
were a cottage industry among like-minded individuals. Id.; see Audrey Rogers, 
Protecting Children on the Internet: Mission Impossible?, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 323, 
326-28 (2009). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 2252. The obscenity requirement was based on congressional fear 
that the courts would strike the legislation as unconstitutional without it. See Amy 
Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 929-30 (2001). 
15 See Adler, supra note 14, at 930-32. 
16 458 U.s. 747,773-74 (1982). 
17 Id. at 759. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 759 n.10 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)). 
20 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (2012)). 
21 Mazzone, supra note 13, at 182. Congress also found the obscenity 
requirement posed enormous hurdles for prosecutors given the complexity of 
obscenity rules and standards. Id. 
22 See, e.g., United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 369-70 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
23 Id. at 373-74. 
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The hearings also revealed that production of child 
pornography was so clandestine that, between 1978 and 1984, 
only one person was convicted for producing child pornography.24 
Thus, the need to stop the flow, rather than the production of 
child pornography, became the preferred route for prosecutors. 
The difficulty of reaching producers has not abated as most child 
pornography is now produced overseas in countries with few or 
no effective laws against child exploitation.25 
Originally, there was no federal ban on possessing child 
pornography in large part because the Supreme Court had 
previously ruled possession of obscene materials was protected by 
the First Amendment.26 However, in Osborne v. Ohio,27 the 
Court ruled that the mere possession or viewing of child 
pornography victimized children and the state could prohibit it. 28 
The Osborne Court reiterated that pornography is a permanent 
record of a victim's abuse that "causes the child victims 
continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come."29 In 
addition, the Court reasoned that banning possession would 
protect future victims of child pornography by drying up the 
market for it.30 Congress reacted to Osborne and passed the 
24 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 604. 
25 See Int'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Child Pornography: Model 
Legislation & Global Review, http://www.icmec.orgimissingkids/servletlPageServlet? 
LanguageCountry=en_X1&PageId=4346 (last visited Mar. 2,2014). 
26 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). The Stanley Court reasoned 
that prohibiting the possession of obscene materials in one's home was inimical to 
the very premise of the First Amendment's protection against state interference 
with what a person thinks, reads, or views in the privacy of his home. Id. at 565-66. 
It specifically rejected the state's claim that it had a legitimate interest in banning 
the possession of obscene material because this material may lead to sexual violence. 
Id. at 566-67. The Stanley Court stated that not only was there no empirical 
evidence that supported the state's claim, but that crime prevention is better served 
by "education and punishment for violations of the law" than by criminalizing 
anticipatory conduct. Id. The Stanley Court also rejected the state's contention that 
criminalizing possession was needed to support the state's ban on the distribution of 
obscene materials, reasoning that this need did not justify a ban on what a person 
read or viewed in his home. Id. at 567-68. 
27 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
28 Id. at 109-10 (distinguishing its ruling in Stanley and holding that the state's 
interest in protecting children by banning possession of child pornography 
outweighed a defendant's First Amendment rights because of the harm inflicted to 
children by all involved in the child pornography chain). 
29 Id. at 111. 
30 Id. at 109-10. The Osborne Court also added a new prospective rationale for 
the possession ban: to thwart the use of images to seduce new victims. Id. at 111. 
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Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 
1990, which banned possession of three or more images of child 
pornography.31 
The advent of computer technology led to congressional 
concerns that existing legislation was out of date. In 1996, 
Congress expanded the definition of child pornography to 
encompass images that "[are] or appearU to be, of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct."32 The Supreme Court 
struck down the ban on virtual child pornography because 
production of virtual child pornography did not abuse actual 
children.33 Congress responded with the 2003 PROTECT Act 
which, among other things, outlawed computer-generated 
31 S. Res. 3266, 101st Congo (1990) (enacted as 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012)). 
Subsequent legislation banned possessing any images but created an affirmative 
defense for possession of less than three images when the defendant took steps to 
destroy the images or reported them to the authorities. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d). 
32 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2012) (emphasis added) (repealed 2003). Congress's 
ban on pornographic images of such virtual children was based on congressional 
findings of compelling state interests in protecting actual children from all child 
pornography, whether depicting real or virtual children. "The legislative history of 
the CPPA was premised on thirteen findings, including that pedophiles use images 
of child pornography to seduce actual children to engage in sexual conduct by 
reducing their inhibitions and desensitizing them." Rogers, supra note 13, at 328; see 
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 
3009-26, 3009-26-3009-27 (1996). Additionally, Congress found that both real and 
virtual child pornography whetted the appetite of molesters by fueling their 
fantasies and stimulating their desire to molest an actual child. § 121(1), 110 Stat. 
at 3009-26-3009-27. Congress found further that the child pornography prosecutions 
would be increasingly difficult as images of virtual children become 
indistinguishable from actual victims of child pornography. See id. § 121(1)(5)-(9). 
Second, it included as child pornography those materials that are "advertised, 
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the 
impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D). 
33 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). The majority also 
rejected the government's indirect harm arguments. It ruled that the risks of virtual 
pornography whetting the appetite of child molesters or being shown by molesters to 
seduce children were too remote to support an abridgement of constitutionally 
protected speech. [d. at 253-54. In addition, the majority disagreed with the 
government's position that prohibiting virtual pornography is necessary to dry up 
the market for actual child pornography because they are part of the same market. 
[d. at 254-55. It noted the reverse-that allowing virtual pornography could in fact 
protect children by drying up the market of actual child pornography. The majority 
also upheld challenges to the CPPA's pandering section that prohibited materials 
that "convey[edl the impression" that they were of a minor engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct. [d. at 255-56. The Court noted that the provision prohibited 
possession of a sexually explicit film containing no minors merely because it was 
promoted as containing minors. [d. at 257. 
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pornography that is "indistinguishable" from a real depiction, 
and created a five-year minimum sentence for transporting, 
distributing, or receiving child pornography.34 Part of the 
PROTECT Act included a new pandering provision with the 
same statutory sentence rules as the possession offense.35 
Accordingly, even if images of child pornography are computer-
generated, the speech offering or seeking them can be 
proscribed.36 Further acknowledging the impact of technology, in 
2008, Congress expanded the ban on possession to include 
"access [ing] with intent to view" online images of child 
pornography after defendants had successfully argued they did 
not possess images unwittingly stored in their computers.37 
C. Sentencing History 
Parallel to congressional and judicial actions on child 
pornography offenses were the development of the Guidelines. 
Congress included mandatory minimums and maximums in 
many of the child pornography laws38 and directed the 
Sentencing Commission to establish Guidelines to implement the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the mandatory 
sentencing Guidelines.39 The Guidelines were meant to limit 
34 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 103(b)(C), 
103(b)(E), 502(a)(1), 117 Stat. 650, 653, 678. The constitutionality of the 
"indistinguishable" language is untested. 
35 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (punishing a person who knowingly "advertises, 
promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits" child pornography). The Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the pandering provision and ruled that offers to 
engage in illegal activity were excluded from First Amendment protection. See 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298-99 (2008). 
36 See generally Rogers, supra note 13. 
37 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). See generally Ty E. Howard, Don't Cache Out Your 
Case: Prosecuting Child Pornography Possession Laws Based on Images Located in 
Temporary Internet Files, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227 (2004). 
38 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b). 
39 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 
1987-88 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2012». See generally 
2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3. To do so, the Guidelines are structured so 
that each offense has a base offense level, which is then adjusted up or down by 
applying special offense characteristics. For example, the current base level for 
receiving child pornography is twenty-two; special offense characteristics include 
adding two levels if the images involved a child under twelve years old, four levels if 
the images portrayed sadistic behavior, and two levels for use of a computer; 
decreases by two levels are made if the defendant did not intend to distribute the 
material. See U.S. SENTENCING GmDELINES MANuAL § 2G2.2 (2013); ORIN S. KERR, 
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judicial discretion, provide for more uniformity in sentences, and 
reflect the purposes of punishing those who commit federal 
offenses.4o From the outset, the Commission labeled 
transporting, receiving, or distributing offenses as "trafficking" in 
child pornography.41 
In a foreshadowing of current sentencing controversies, 
when possession was federally outlawed in 1991, the Commission 
amended the Guidelines by moving the receipt offense to the new 
possession guideline because it determined that "receipt is a 
logical predicate to possession."42 This change lasted less than 
one month because of strong congressional objection to the 
reduced penalty for reCeIVIng child pornography.43 The 
Commission continued to recognize the overlap between 
possession and receipt but separate Guidelines existed for 
trafficking offenses and possession offenses until 2004, when the 
Commission finally consolidated them.44 As discussed below, the 
consolidation of sentencing criteria without changes in offense 
categories only served to worsen sentencing controversies.45 
COMPUTER CRIME LAw 278-79 (2d ed. 2009). The court can then make additional 
upward or downward modifications based on the specific circumstances of the 
defendant, the crime, or the victim. For example, if the defendant accepts 
responsibility for his actions, the offense level is decreased by two levels. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2013). With that final offense level 
calculation, the defendant's criminal history is considered and categorized. The 
Guidelines then provide a sentencing table that assigns a sentencing range. For 
example, in the previous example of a defendant receiving child pornography, if the 
defendant's final offense level is twenty-six, and he has no prior offenses so that his 
criminal history category is I, the Sentencing Table would call for a sentencing range 
of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. KERR, supra. 
40 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012); 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
3, at 1 n.2. The four punishment rationales can be summarized as retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 
41 See 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (using trafficking to refer 
to the § 2252 crimes of transporting, receiving, and distributing child pornography). 
Initially, there were only two offense characteristic increase triggers: minor under 
twelve years old and distribution based on retail value. [d. at 12, 17; see also infra 
notes 160-82 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the distribution 
enhancement). 
42 2009 COMMISION REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. 
43 [d. at 19-22. 
44 [d. at 42-43. With the consolidation, the Commission added a two-level 
decrease if defendant's conduct was limited to receipt without intent to distribute. 
[d. at 48. It did so specifically to ameliorate the disproportionality in sentences that 
the mandatory minimum was apt to create because it found that simple receipt was 
very similar to simple possession cases. [d. 
45 See infra Part III. 
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Over the years, the Commission added numerous offense 
enhancements based on what it assessed to be aggravating 
factors, such as depicting prepubescent children46 or sado-
masochistic attacks on childrenY While some enhancements 
were made after the Commission conducted a detailed study of 
empirical data, other enhancements resulted solely from 
congressional directive. The most controversial today are 
discussed below. 
D. Current Sentencing Controversy 
A chorus of scholars and judges have criticized the 
Guidelines as being more the product of public hysteria over 
child pornographers rather than being tied to a rational 
assessment of the goals of punishment. 48 A leading critic of the 
current sentencing regime, Troy Stabenow, noted in his widely-
cited report, "The flaw with U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 today is that a 
common, first time offender can chart at the statutory maximum, 
regardless of Acceptance of Responsibility and Criminal 
History."49 He outlined how the Commission increased the 
Guidelines based on congressional directives, such as the 
PROTECT Act's mandate of five-year minimums for trafficking 
offenses, rather than on empirical studies. 50 
For example, at the same time Congress made its failed 
attempt to ban computer-generated child pornography in 1996, it 
also directed the Sentencing Commission to increase sentences 
46 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2G2.2(b)(2) (2013) (adding two-
level enhancement). 
47 See id. § 2G2.2(b)(4) (adding four-level enhancement). 
48 See, e.g., STABENOW, supra note 1, at 38; Jelani Jefferson Exum, Making the 
Punishment Fit the (Computer) Crime: Rebooting Notions of Possession for the 
Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography Offenses, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 23-24 
(2010); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex 
Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 865 (2011); Arlen Specter & Linda Dale Hoffa, A 
Quiet but Growing Judicial Rebellion Against Harsh Sentences for Child 
Pornography Offenses-Should the Laws Be Changed?, 35 CHAMPION 12, 13 (2011); 
see Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: 
Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 545, 560-61 
(2011). 
49 STABENOW, supra note 1, at 26. A Westlaw search conducted on February 13, 
2012 showed sixteen federal circuit court and twenty-three district court citations to 
the report. 
60 STABENOW, supra note 1, at 21. 
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whenever a computer was used in child pornography offenses.51 
It did so but cautioned such a broad application did not 
adequately differentiate between computer users, who, in 1996, 
could range from a simple downloader to a "large-scale, 
commercial pornographerO ... who [could] upload, send or post 
illegal images."52 
The Commission's promise to monitor the array of computer 
usage is all the more necessary today because computer 
technology has fundamentally altered the child pornography 
landscape. While only twenty-eight percent of defendants used a 
computer to commit child pornography offenses in 1995, by 2008, 
ninety-six percent of defendants used one, and today, that 
number is most likely one hundred percent. 53 This ubiquitous 
use is at the heart of the criticism of the enhancement. 54 More 
significantly, the abilities the Commission ascribed only to 
sophisticated commercial operators, such as posting and 
uploading, can be performed by anyone today on a personal 
computer or tablet. Thus, the enhancement is flawed because 
the very nature of computer capabilities make the trafficker and 
purveyor distinction meaningless. 
Another enhancement that has garnered extensive criticism 
is for the number of images possessed.55 First added in 2003, this 
enhancement did not have the benefit of empirical study or the 
standard notice and public comment period.56 Because computer 
technology allows individual to gather hundreds of images with 
the click of a mouse, some have criticized this enhancement as 
51 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 26, 30. The congressional 
directive was contained in the Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995. 
[d. at 26. 
52 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SEX OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN: FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING FEDERAL PENALTIES 28-29 (1996), available at 
http://www. ussc.govlLegislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony _and_ 
Reports/Sex_Offense_Topics/199606_RtC_Sex_Crimes_Against_Children/199606_Rt 
C_SCAC.pdf. 
53 STABENOW, supra note 1, at 16; 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 
30 n.148. 
54 See, e.g., STABENOW, supra note 1, at 15-16. See generally Exum, supra note 
48; Hessick, supra note 48. 
55 Ian N. Friedman & Kristina W. Supler, Child Pornography Sentencing: The 
Road Here and the Road Ahead, 21 FED. SENTG REP. 83, 85 (2008). 
56 STABENOW, supra note 1, at 23-24; 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 39 n.190. The effective date of the enhancement was in November 2004. See 2012 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 140. 
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inconsequential in assessing blameworthiness. 57 Professor 
Douglas Berman has echoed Stabenow's findings and has 
testified that sentencing enhancements such as use of a computer 
"[are] irrational because logically and factually, the 
characteristics are simply not genuine aggravating factors. 
Rather, they are inherent in just about any downloading 
offense."58 
Other scholars criticize the sentences as based upon a faulty 
premise that possession of child pornography is as bad or worse 
than the child abuse that created it.59 They assert this parity 
fails to recognize the derivative nature of the child pornography 
offenses in that images are unlawful only because they are 
recording and then spreading images of actual abuse.60 Critics 
further claim that part of the increase is based on an unproven 
preventative rationale that possessors of child pornography are 
more likely to abuse children.6! As part of its review of child 
pornography offenses, the Sentencing Commission examined a 
number of studies and concluded that while general recidivism 
rates for downstream users of pornography were similar to that 
of all federal offenders, the rate of sexual recidivism was less 
than commonly believed.62 Yet, it found also that as many as 
thirty-eight percent of downstream users had prior criminal 
sexually dangerous behavior.s3 
In addition to scholarly criticism, surveys of district court 
judges conducted by the Commission in 2009 show that seventy 
percent believed the Guideline range for possession was too high; 
sixty-nine percent thought the range for receipt was too high; 
and thirty percent believed the range for distribution was too 
57 See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1010 CE.D. Wis. 
2008). See generally STABENOW, supra note 1, at 21; Friedman & Supler, supra note 
55. 
58 United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 397 (D.N.J. 2008), affd, 624 
F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010). 
59 Adler, supra note 14, at 985 ("Child pornography law conflates act and 
image[s]."); Hessick, supra note 48, at 864-65. But see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747,759-60 n.lO (1982). 
60 See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 48, at 865,867-68. 
61 See Hessick, supra note 48, at 870-71. 
62 2012 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 306-10. It found a 30% rate of 
general recidivism, but only a 7.4% rate of sexual recidivism. [d. at 310. 
63 [d. at 205. 
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high.64 Circuit courts have also expressed reservations about the 
Guideline ranges. For example, the Second Circuit, in United 
States v. Dorvee, found that a 240-month sentence for 
distribution of child pornography was substantively 
unreasonable.65 It was troubled that the Guidelines for 
trafficking offenses were not based on empirical data, but rather 
on congressional directive. 66 
There are courts and scholars who support the Guidelines.67 
For example, in testimony before the Sentencing Commission, 
Ernie Allen, President of the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children, explained that, as with other illegal 
contraband, child pornography needs to be stopped at the point of 
production and at the point of distribution and possession.68 He 
pointed out that the Supreme Court has found a causal link 
between the demand for images and the possession and 
distribution of the images.69 Some have discounted the oft-cited 
Stabenow report as fundamentally flawed. 70 For example, one 
district court judge noted Stabenow fails to identify the 
characteristics of the "average offender" who charts at the 
statutory maximum, but when one does so, it is a person that has 
"more than 600 images of prepubescent child pornography 
containing sadistic and masochistic images."71 
64 United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 606-07 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM'N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Research_and_StatisticslResearch_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey. pdf). 
65 616 F.3d 174, 176 (2d Cir. 2010). 
66 [d. at 184. It also found that the district court made procedural errors in 
calculating the sentence. [d. at 181-82. 
67 See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, No. 5:09CR534, 2010 WL 3219530, at *1 
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2010), affd, 455 F. App'x 624 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 848-49 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (criticizing the 
Stabenow report), affd, 669 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Fiorella, 602 
F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1074, 1076 (N.D. Iowa 2009), affd sub nom. United States v. 
Shuler 598 F.3d 444 (8th Cir. 2010). See generally Exum, supra note 48. 
68 See Ernie Allen, President & CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited 
Children, Statement at the United States Sentencing Commission Regional Hearing 
on the 25th Anniversary of the Passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Oct. 
20, 2009), available at http://www.ussc.govlLegislative_and_Public_AffairslPublic_ 
Hearings_and_Meetings/20091020-211 Allen_testimony. pdf. 
69 [d. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-60, n.10 (1982); Osborne v. 
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990». 
70 See, e.g., Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 852. 
71 [d. (internal quotation marks ommitted). 
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It is telling that the Commission itself has criticized the 
direction Congress was taking. With the Sentencing 
Commission's call for public hearings on child pornography 
sentences, even the Justice Department agreed that sentencing 
enhancements based on the use of a computer and the number of 
images involved in a crime need to be reassessed.72 In its 2012 
report, the Commission recommended the guidelines be revised 
to better measure culpability.73 For example, it agreed that the 
number of images per se was an "outmoded measure[]" of an 
offender's culpability; 74 instead, it suggested a new measure that 
would focus on whether the offender engaged in online child 
pornography communities.75 
Both sides make some sound arguments. There is validity to 
critics' arguments that derivative harm is typically less severe 
than direct harm. 76 Yet they ignore that downstream users 
inflict independent psychological and dignitary harm.77 They 
may, in fact, be inflicting more harm than the producer of the 
image. Take, for example, a recent case in which an elementary 
school principal pled guilty to producing child pornography after 
he was caught surreptitiously recording boys' genitals while they 
were in the bathroom. 78 Here, the harm suffered by the victims 
72 Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy and Legislation, 
U.s. Dep't of Justice, to Chief Judge William K. Sessions III, U.s. Sentencing 
Comm'n 6 (June 28, 2010), available at http://sentencing.typepad.comlfiles/annual_ 
letter _2010 _final_ 062810. pdf. 
[d. 
We believe the Commission should complete its review of the sentencing 
guidelines applicable to child exploitation crimes and prepare a report to 
Congress that might include recommendations for reforming the current 
child exploitation guidelines. The goal of any such reform would be to 
update the guidelines to address changing technology and realities 
surrounding these offenses, improve the consistency of sentences across 
child exploitation crimes, and ensure that the sentences for certain child 
exploitation offenses adequately reflect the seriousness of the crimes. 
73 2012 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 320-25. 
74 [d. at 32l. 
75 [d. at 312-14. 
76 Some disagree with these arguments. See Hessick, supra note 48, at 866 
(citing critics). 
77 See supra notes 179, 183. 
78 Warren Richey, Child Pornography: Former Elementary-School Principal Gets 
30 Years, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 22,2011), http://www.csmonitor.comlUSN 
Justicel2011111221Child-pornography-Former-elementary-school-prinicipal-gets-30-
years. The FBI also found 32,000 images and over 12,000 videos of child 
pornography in his home, mostly obtained via the Internet. One might question 
whether the display was the "lascivious exhibition of the genitals" as required to 
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was the embarrassment and distress of knowing the images were 
being circulated; they were not physically abused in the creation 
of them. Thus, we cannot say that harm inflicted by downstream 
users is less severe than harm inflicted by the producer of the 
images; a more nuanced approach that focuses on case specifics 
would be a better measure of harm. 
The danger, however, of the intensity of the criticism of 
current sentences is that it has caused some to dismiss the 
premise that any harm has occurred. Many defendants claim 
possession is a "victimless" crime,79 and while some lower courts 
agree, more reasoned courts have soundly rejected the notion 
that derivative use of child pornography is victimless.so On the 
other hand, mulish support of the current sentencing regime in 
face of the mounting criticism of the Guidelines risks continued 
judicial nullification and randomized sentences. While Congress 
has sought to acknowledge the impact of technology on child 
pornography offenses, it has done so only by expanding the range 
of prohibited activities.s1 It would be wise for Congress to also 
see technology as a limiting force in that the labels no longer 
define distinct behaviors, and therefore, the differential 
punishment scheme is increasingly devoid of rationale. 
When we add to the sentencing controversy the new problem 
of how technology has conflated the offenses, we are left with a 
situation in dire need of reform. Essential to the solution is an 
understanding of the technological changes to the manner in 
which the child pornography crimes are being committed. The 
next Part traces these changes. 
qualify as child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2012), as it appears the boys were 
merely urinating in the bathroom. See United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 439-
40 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Kemmerling, 285 F.3d 644, 645-46 (8th Cir. 
2002); United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), affd sub nom. 
United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987). 
79 See, e.g., United States v. D'Andrea, 473 F.3d 859, 865 (8thCir. 2007); United 
States Y. Rogers, 423 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 2005); State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378, 
386 (Ariz. 2006). 
80 See, e.g., United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2007) (criticizing 
the district court's reasoning that a possession offense had no real victim); United 
States Y. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 863-64 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (criticizing 
courts that see possession as a victimless crime). 
81 See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012). 
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II. THE GROWTH OF TECHNOLOGY 
As child pornography legislation developed over time, so did 
computer technology. The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the 
first spread of computers from isolated government and 
industrial usage to everyday personal usage.82 Concomitantly, 
connectivity between computers was evolving. In the 1970s, 
computer engineers at research institutions throughout the 
United States began to link their computers together using 
telecommunications technology. The first networking card was 
created in 1973, allowing data transfer between connected 
computers.83 In time, the network, originally limited to academic 
and military institutions, spread and became known as the 
Internet.84 
As computers were linked, file-sharing and online 
discussions were becoming increasingly popular. The first 
Internet discussion system, "Usenet," was developed in 1979.85 
Its main purpose was the exchange of text-based messages, but 
82 See M. Scott Boone, The Past, Present, and Future of Computing and Its 
Impact on Digital Rights Management, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 413, 416-18; see also 
Rebecca Blain, Evolution of Technology: The History of Computers, 
ARTICLES FACTORY, http://www.articlesfactory.com/articles/computers/the-evolution-
of-technology-the-history-of-computers.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). The same 
year, Microsoft released the MS-DOS operating system, which was easy to operate. 
!d. 
83 Blain, supra note 82. 
84 Exhibits: Internet History 1970's, COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM, 
http://www .computerhistory.orglinternet_history/internet_history _70s.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2014). The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) 
was the world's first operational packet switching network and the core network of a 
set that came to compose the global Internet. The network was funded by United 
States Department of Defense for use by its projects at universities and research 
laboratories. With packet switching, a data system could use one communications 
link to communicate with more than one machine by collecting data into datagrams 
and transmitting these as packets onto the attached network link, whenever the link 
is not in use. Thus, not only could the link be shared, much as a single post box can 
be used to post letters to different destinations, but each packet could be routed 
independently of other packets. ARPANET-The First Internet, LMNG INTERNET, 
http://www.livinginternet.com/ilii_arpanet.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
85 See generally John L. Sullivan III, Note, Federal Courts Act as a Toll Booth to 
the Information Super Highway-Are Internet Restrictions Too High of a Price To 
Pay?, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 935 (2010). Usenet was originally written by a computer 
scientist at UNC to help communicate with Duke. COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM, 
supra note 84. 
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through attachments, it allowed users to encode files and 
distribute them to participating subscribers of Usenet 
newsgroups.86 
Between 1979 and the mid-1990s, file-sharing was done 
through Usenet and bulletin board systems ("BBS").87 
Thousands of BBSs sprang up, creating active virtual 
communities. The "alt" hierarchy enabled the Usenet community 
to exercise freedom of speech by allowing anyone to create a 
group, such as alt. sex. 88 Bulletin boards and Usenet eventually 
became obsolete as the Internet grew in popularity.89 
In the 1990s, the tandem spread of applications like e-mail 
and the World Wide Web and the development of fast networking 
technologies like Ethernet90 saw computer networking become 
commonplace.91 The number of computers that are networked 
has grown explosively, from one million in 199292 to over two 
billion by 2012.93 A very large proportion of personal computers 
regularly connect to the Internet to communicate and receive 
information. ''Wireless'' networking, which uses mobile phone 
networks, has meant that networking is becoming increasingly 
pervasive.94 
86 See Paul K. Ohm, Comment, On Regulating the Internet: Usenet, A Case 
Study, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1941, 1945-49 (1999). 
87 See U.s. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FILE-SHARING PROGRAMS: PEER-TO-PEER 
NETWORKS PROVIDE READY ACCESS TO CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 6 (2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03351.pdf. 
88 Brian Reid, Alt Hierarchy History, LIVING INTERNET, 
http://www.livinginternet.comlu/ui_alt.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
89 See Sascha Segan, R.IP Usernet: 1980-2008, PCMAG (July 31, 2008), 
www.pcmag.comlarticle2l0.2817 ,2326849,00.asp. 
90 John E. George & Paul F. Kolesar, 10-Gigabit Ethernet Development for LAN 
Cabling Systems Well Underway, LIGHTWAVE (Dec. 1, 1999), http://www.light 
waveonline.comlarticles/printlvolume-16/issue-13/special-reportl10-gigabit-ethernet-
development-for-lan-cabling-systems-well-underway-53490282.html. Ethernet is 
computer connectivity hardware that was developed by Xerox Parc, a research and 
development company. Edward L. Rubin, Computer Languages as Networks and 
Power Structures: Governing the Development of XML, 53 SMU L. REV. 1447, 1450 
(2000). 
91 Mark Ward, How the Web Went World Wide, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2006, 
2:26 PM), http://newsvote.bbc.co.uklmpapps/pagetools/printlnews.bbc.co.ukl2/hiltech 
nology/5242252.stm. 
92 COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM, supra note 84. 
93 Internet Usage Statistics: The Internet Big Picture, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated Feb. 18, 2014). 
94 See AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, MOBILE ACCESS 2010 
2 (2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-medialFiles/Reportsl20101 
PIP _Mobile_Access_2010.pdf. 
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While file-sharing was initially done through Usenet and 
Bulletin Boards, in 1999, Napster was released.95 Napster was a 
centralized system that indexed and stored music files that 
users of Napster made available on their computers for others to 
download.96 Files were transferred directly between users after 
authorization by Napster.97 It became extremely popular, and in 
2001, Napster was sued by several recording companies. Napster 
lost in court against these companies and was eventually shut 
down.98 
The next technological milestone was the development of 
decentralized file-sharing systems.99 The decentralized systems 
allow users to directly connect to each other's files, rather than 
going through a central index site. loo In 2001, Kazaa was 
released, with users mainly exchanging music files and other file 
types, such as videos, applications, and documents, over the 
Internet. IOI Until its decline in 2004, Kazaa was the most 
popular file-sharing program in the world.102 As with Napster, it 
faced, and lost, numerous copyright infringement suits, until it 
declined in use and popularity.103 
95 Spencer E. Ante et aI., Inside Napster, BUSINESWEEK, Aug. 14, 2000, at 112, 
114-15; M. Eric Johnson et aI., The Evolution of the Peer-to-Peer File Sharing 
Industry and the Security Risks for Users, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST HAW. INT'L 
CONFERENCE ON SyS. SCIS. 2 (2008), available at http://www.computer.org/csdll 
proceedings/hicss/2008/307 5/00/307 50383. pdf. 
96 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905 (N.D. Cal. 
2000), affd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see Karl Taro 
Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME (Oct. 2, 2000), http://www.time.comltime/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,998068,00.htmI. 
97 A & M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 905. 
98 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and 
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 263, 287-89 (2002); A & 
M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927. 
99 See Johnson et aI., supra note 95, at 1-2. 
100 Napster's Sons: Singing a Different Tune?, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 
20, 2002), http://www.businessweek.comlstories/2002-02-20/napsters-sons-singing-a-
different-tune. 
101 See generally Richard Swope, Comment, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and 
Copyright Infringement: Danger Ahead for Individuals Sharing Files on the Internet, 
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 861, 875-88 (2004). 
102 Lance D. Clouse, Note, Virtual Border Customs: Prevention of International 
Online Music Piracy Within the Ever-Evolving Technological Landscape, 38 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 109, 122 n.63 (2003). 
103 See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487,492-93,515 
(1st Cir. 2011); Eric Pfanner, Record and Movie Industries Reach a Settlement with 
Kazaa, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2006), http://www.nytimes.coml2006/07/28/technology/ 
28kazaa.html? J=O. 
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New iterations of file-sharing networks, such as Limewire 
and BitTorrent, continue to allow no-cost, decentralized, peer-to-
peer file-sharing. 104 Furthermore, file-sharing software evolved, 
so that computer users no longer had to install and configure 
sophisticated multiple file-sharing programs. 105 Today, peer-to-
peer members need only download the compatible software from 
the Internet to become part of the network and be able to 
download digital files from other members of that network. lOG 
They can also upload or post their files onto the network. lo7 
A crucial aspect of peer-to-peer file-sharing is that the 
default setting for these networks is that downloaded files are 
placed in the user's "shared" folder, which allows others in the 
network to access the files.lOs A user must affirmatively change 
his network setting to disable this sharing feature. lo9 The 
network is designed to encourage sharing by providing faster 
downloading if the user allows sharing. no As the Internet has 
grown, so too has online child pornography.111 By 2005, child 
pornography over the Internet was a 3 billion dollar-a-year 
industry, consisting of over 4.2 million pornographic websites 
and approximately 372 million pornographic pages. ll2 The file-
104 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-
20 (2005). In 2010, the recording industry obtained a permanent injunction against 
Limewire, shutting down its operation. See Arista Records LLC v. Lime Wire LLC, 
No. 06 Civ. 05936 (KMW), 2010 WL 4256219 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (proposed 
consent injunction). Shortly thereafter, unnamed developers released a new version 
entitled "Limewire Pirate Edition." See Ethan Smith, LimeWire Disavows New 
'Pirate Edition', WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBIOOO 
1424052748704804504575606862080016220.html. 
105 Andrew Eichner, File Sharing: A Tool For Innovation, or a Criminal 
Instrument?, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. (Sept. 2011), http://bciptf.org/wp-
contentluploadsl2011109/Andrew_EichnecNote_File_Sharing_EICedits-fillal-
edit.pdf. 
106 United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009); United 
States V. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 875-76 (7th Cir. 2007); United States V. Griffin, 482 
F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 2007). 
109 See Carani, 492 F.3d at 869. 
110 United States V. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (lOth Cir. 2007). 
111 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 87, at 11, 13; see also U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION PREVENTION 
AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/pscldocs/natstrategyreport.pdf (listing internet distribution 
channels). 
112 Women's Services & Resources, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV., Pornography, 
https://wsr.byu.edu/pornographystats (last visited Mar. 2,2014). 
1032 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1013 
sharing network Gnutella has reported receiving 116,000 
requests for child pornography in 2010. 113 The ability to seek, 
download, and share files has completely changed the landscape 
for many industries, notably in the legitimate entertainment 
world. It has had the same dramatic impact in the child 
pornography arena. 
The newest technology is cloud computing where files are 
stored in a shared pool of computer resources on the Internet, 
accessible from any computer. 114 Users do not download and 
install applications on their own device or computer; all 
processing and storage is maintained by the cloud server.ll5 The 
latest commercial uses promote file storage and access. For 
example, a person may store files from his computer onto a cloud 
service provider, such as Dropbox.116 The cloud system allows 
him to access his files from any computer by logging onto his 
cloud server.ll7 A cloud user may permit shared access to his 
files by designating users.118 Thus, similar to peer-to-peer 
networks, once a person allows access to his files, others may see 
them at any time. Unlike peer-to-peer networks, private cloud 
services require that a person designate who may have shared 
access.119 
The cloud is just the latest battleground between law 
enforcement and child pornographers. The ability of child 
pornographers to use cloud computing for their wares has 
already been recognized. While some cloud providers are 
employing filtering techniques to suppress access to illegal 
113 Exum, supra note 4S, at 6; Pornography Industry Is Larger than the 
Revenues of the Top Technology, Cy TALK BLOG (Jan. 1, 2010), http://blog.cy 
talk.com/2010/01lweb-porn-revenuel. 
114 See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NATL INST.OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (2011), 
available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubsiSOO-145/SP800-145. pdf; see 
also Cloud Computing: Clash of the Clouds, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/nodelI4637206?story-id=14637206. 
115 See Cloud Computing: Clash of the Clouds, supra note 114. 
116 Claire Cain Miller, Dropbox Bids To Find Entry in Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 28,2011, at B1O. 
117 See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 114. 
118 See id. at 3. 
U9 See id. 
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images, there is a growing concern the cloud will provide deeper 
cover for pornographers.120 At the same time, cloud technology is 
beginning to raise possession and distribution questions.121 
III. THE LINES BLUR 
As file-sharing networks have proliferated, participants in 
the child pornography industry can no longer be defined by terms 
suited for a bricks-and-mortar world rather than a virtual world. 
We need to consider more fundamentally whether the problem is 
not just the piecemeal growth of offenses and enhancements, but 
whether the activities prohibited no longer have meaningful 
distinctions in the Internet age. 
In the late 1970s when investigative reporters first exposed 
the child pornography market, it was clear who fell into the 
categories of transporters, distributors, and receivers (possession 
was not yet a crime).122 For example, the defendant in New York 
v. Ferber was the owner of an adult bookstore and knowingly sold 
films of underage boys masturbating.123 Once sold, those films 
were distributed and were no longer available for Ferber to 
resell.124 In contrast, take the person today who uploads a child 
pornography video to a peer-to-peer network and then leaves his 
file open. The video is never depleted; even if someone 
downloads it, the original is still available for further downloads. 
As the following discussion explores, the ramifications of this 
new technology are causing a collapse of easily definable offenses 
and a swell of fresh defense challenges. 
A. Receiving vs. Possessing 
Let us compare the defendant in Osborne v. Ohio125 to a 
contemporary possessor. Clyde Osborne was convicted of 
violating an Ohio statute that barred the possession of child 
pornography after police found four photographs of child 
120 See Rob Gillen, Digital Forensics and the Cloud, FEDSCOOP (Jan. 17,2011, 
4:21 PM), http://fedscoop.comldigital-forensics-and-the-cloud/; Martin Kaste, A Click 
Away: Preventing Online Child Porn Viewing, NPR (Aug. 31, 2010, 4:12 
PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129526579 (discussing 
filtering by internet service providers and search engines). 
121 See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text. 
122 FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 603-04. 
123 458 U.S. 747, 751-52 (1982). 
124 See id. 
125 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
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pornography in a desk drawer in the bedroom of his house.126 
The appellant testified a friend brought the pictures to his 
home. 127 It appears Osborne was charged only with the 
possession offense.128 Contrast Osborne with the defendant in 
United States v. Davenport, in which government agents found 
hundreds of images and videos of child pornography on the 
defendant's computer.129 The defendant was indicted on one 
count of receiving child pornography and on one count of 
possessing child pornography. 130 He pled guilty and was 
sentenced to seventy-eight months in prison for each count, to 
run concurrently.l31 
On appeal of the district court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the defendant argued the sentence on 
both possession and receipt violated his Fifth Amendment double 
jeopardy right because the two statutory provisions proscribe the 
same conduct. 132 As the defendant claimed, "It is impossible to 
'receive' something without, at least at the very instant of 
'receipt,' also 'possessing' it." 133 The Ninth Circuit conducted a 
Blockberger analysis134 test and found that the receipt provision 
did not require proof of any additional elements beyond those 
required by the possession provision, and therefore, the 
126 Id. at 139. 
127 [d. 
128 [d. at 106-07. 
129 519 F.3d 940, 972 (9th Cir. 2008). 
130 [d. 
131 [d. 
132 [d. at 942-43. The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees 
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
133 Davenport, 519 F.3d at 943. 
134 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.s. 299, 304 (1932). The Blockburger 
Court stated that if "the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are 
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the 
other does not." !d. In determining whether two statutory provisions are punishing 
the same conduct, the courts first look to congressional intent. Absent clear intent to 
punish the defendant under two provisions, it is presumed that the legislature does 
not intend to impose two punishments for the same offense. See Rutledge v. United 
States, 517 U.s. 292, 297 (1996). Nevertheless, the presumption against allowing 
multiple punishments for the same crime may be overcome if there is a clear 
indication of legislative intent to allow courts to impose them. See Missouri v. 
Hunter, 459 U.s. 359, 368-69 (1983); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 
(1981); United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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government could not charge defendant with both offenses.135 
The court acknowledged that prior to 1998, when Congress 
changed the requisite number of images for a possession charge 
from three or more images to any number of images, prosecution 
for violating both provisions was permissible because of the 
variance in the number of images needed for prosecution of 
receipt versus possession. 136 The court reasoned that the older 
statutory language would allow for multiple convictions, but the 
amended language made the possession crime fall in as a lesser-
included crime of the receipt of child pornography. 137 
Other courts have agreed with Davenport's reasoning that 
the prohibition against double jeopardy bars multiplicitous 
charges of receipt and possession when a person downloads child 
pornography from the Internet.13s The remedy is to vacate the 
lesser offense,139 which still highlights a difficulty with the 
present statutory scheme-the receipt charge that remains has a 
mandatory five-year minimum sentence.140 Nevertheless, many 
courts have distinguished the Davenport line of cases and have 
135 Davenport, 519 F.3d at 947. The receipt statute requires that pornographic 
material be "shipped or transported in ... interstate ... commerce by any means, 
including by computer," while the possession law states the pornography need only 
be "produced using materials that have been ... shipped or transported 
in ... interstate ... commerce." Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (2012) with 
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). The Davenport court found that because possession's nexus 
requirement can be met in one of two ways and receipt's nexus requirement is one of 
those two ways, possession is a lesser included offense of receipt. Davenport, 519 
F.3d at 944-45. 
136 Davenport, 519 F.3d at 946-47; see supra Part I.C. In a change that was 
meant to demonstrate a "zero tolerance" policy toward child pornographers, 
Congress amended the possession offense in 1998 to ban possession of even one 
image, whereas previous legislation limited the offense to three or more images. See 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Instead it gave defendants an affirmative defense if they 
possessed fewer than three images. Id. § 2252A(d). 
137 Davenport, 519 F.3d at 944-45. The court did recognize that an affirmative 
defense was only applicable to the possession provision but stated affirmative 
defenses are not considered elements of the crime for Blockburger purposes. Accord 
United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 72 (3d Cir. 2008). 
138 See, e.g., United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009); Bobb, 
577 F.3d at 1374; Miller, 527 F.3d at 71; United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 
891 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Schaff, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1377 (S.D. Ga. 
2011); United States v. Cunningham, No. 07-0298, 2010 WL 3809853, at *2 (W.D. 
Pa. Sept. 22, 2010); United States v. Pomarico, No. 06 CR 113(RJD), 2010 WL 
4608423, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2010); see also United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 
142, 154 (2d Cir. 2009) (dicta supporting Davenport reasoning). 
139 See, e.g., Schaff, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 1380-81; Cunningham, 2010 WL 
3809853, at *1; Pomarico, 2010 WL 4608423, at *2. 
140 See 18 U.s.C. § 2252A(b)(I). 
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upheld convictions for both receipt and possession when the 
government asserts that its charges are different for image 
downloads. For example, in United States v. Bobb, the 
defendant's convictions and sentences were based on activities 
that occurred on two different dates. 141 The evidence at trial 
established the defendant received child pornography by 
downloading files from a pornographic website, and on another 
date, he possessed over 6,000 additional images. 142 Accordingly, 
the Eleventh Circuit, while agreeing with the Davenport line of 
reasoning, upheld the defendant's convictions, finding that the 
government introduced evidence sufficient to convict him of 
distinct offenses.143 
With defendants using computers to obtain quantities of 
images via the Internet, it appears quite easy for the government 
to fashion a case in a manner to avoid double jeopardy violations 
by basing the receipt count on different images than the 
possession count.144 Yet, it is questionable whether such action is 
appropriate when the statutes themselves no longer reflect clear 
divisions of activity. It is outmoded to find, as some courts have, 
that those who traffic in child pornography by receiving it "are 
more directly tied to the market for such products" and the abuse 
of children necessary for that market than are possessors. 145 
When the person engages in one act146 and thereby commits two 
crimes, the stated rationale for highly divergent punishments is 
dubious. 
141 577 F.3d at 1369-70. 
142 Id. at 1368-69. 
143 Id. at 1375. When multiple images are found, courts have held that these 
images may not be the basis of multiple counts of the same offense. See, e.g., 
Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 155. But see United States v. Flyer, No. CR 05-1049 TUC-FRZ, 
2006 WL 2590459, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 7, 2006). Therefore, the 6,000 images 
resulted in one count of possession. The number of images, however, is a sentencing 
enhancement. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
144 See, e.g., Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147-48; United States v. Burgess, No. 
1:09CRI7, 2010 WL 2219335, at * 1 (W.D.N.C. May 28,2010); cf. United States. v. 
Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 79 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting double jeopardy issue sua sponte). 
145 See United States v. Myers, 355 F.3d 1040, 1042-43 (7th Cir. 2004); accord 
United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2008) (Graber, J., 
dissenting) ("[TJhe statutory provisions are directed toward different harms."); 
United States v. Grosenheider, 200 F.3d 321, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2000). 
146 It is, of course, possible to inadvertently receive child pornography and then 
consciously choose to keep it. In that instance, the person would be guilty only of 
possession. See United States v. Watzman, 486 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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If we look at these cases in the context of the development of 
the child pornography laws, we can see the genesis of the original 
distinctions since possession was not initially covered and receipt 
was initially thought of as part of the commercial trade; these 
variables have disappeared. The Commission recognized this as 
early as 1990 when it tried to join the receiving and possessing 
offense Guidelines, a move roundly rejected by Congress.147 
Additionally, in its 1996 Report to Congress, the Commission 
detailed that some courts were sentencing receipt cases as 
possession cases because there was little difference in the 
perceived seriousness of the offenses.148 The offense Guidelines 
were eventually combined, but this created a new problem-
certain enhancements previously limited to the trafficking 
offenses now apply to simple possession cases.149 
When a person can receive and possess images with a few 
clicks of a mouse, the overlap in the offenses is obvious.15o A 
child is harmed because the image is circulated, but the offender 
cannot be said to be more entrenched in the market by his receipt 
than by his possession of the image. 
B. Distributing us. Possessing 
The conflation of offenses is further complicated because 
distribution is both an offense and a sentencing enhancement to 
receipt and possession charges. 
1. Distribution as an Offense 
Peer-to-peer file-sharing, only popularized in the last few 
years, has dramatically altered the collecting of child 
pornography. It has also led to defendants being charged and 
147 When possession was federally outlawed in 1991, Congress directed the 
Commission to establish sentencing Guidelines for the new possession offense. 2009 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. Initially, the Commission amended the 
Guidelines by moving the receipt offense to the new possession guideline because it 
determined that "receipt is a logical predicate to possession." [d. It distinguished 
possession and simple receipt from receipt with intent to traffic. [d. This change 
lasted less than one month because of strong congressional objection to the reduced 
penalty for receiving child pornography. [d. at 20-22. Thus, separate Guidelines 
existed for trafficking offenses and possession offenses until 2004, when the 
Commission consolidated them. [d. at 42. 
148 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-30. 
149 [d. at 49; see supra notes 44--45 and accompanying text. 
150 See 2012 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 326-27 (recommending that 
the sentences for receipt and possession be aligned). 
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convicted of both distributing and possessing child pornography. 
For example, in United States v. Schaffer, a defendant 
downloaded images and videos from a peer-to-peer network and 
stored them in a shared folder on his computer, which was 
accessible to others.l5l Arguing that he merely left open his 
shared file, the defendant sought to have his conviction for 
distribution set aside.152 The Tenth Circuit rejected his 
contention, noting that he freely allowed access to his 
computerized stash of images and videos, knowing that others 
could download his stash.153 The court made an analogy to a self-
serve gas station reasoning that the gas station owner who 
advertises his product need not actively pump gas to be in the 
business of distributing it. 154 Similarly, it reasoned that the 
knowing passive distribution of child pornography from a shared 
network was sufficient to sustain the conviction.155 
Recently, some courts have recognized the overlap between 
offenses caused by technology. The Third Circuit, in United 
States v. Grober, affirmed a sentence that substantially deviated 
from the Guidelines in a case where the defendant traded via the 
Internet a number of images of child pornography.156 Charged 
with transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography, 
the defendant pled guilty.157 The district court ruled this was a 
"typical downloading" case, and sentenced him to sixty months 
imprisonment-the mandatory minimum-rather than the 
Guideline amount of 235 to 293 months. 158 Rejecting the 
government's appeal of the sentence, the Third Circuit found that 
the deviation was appropriate because it agreed that the case 
"center [edl on personal possession of illicit images obtained on 
151 472 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007). 
152 [d. at 1223. 
153 [d. 
154 [d. at 1223-24. 
155 [d.; accord United States V. Collins, 642 F.3d 654, 656-57 (8th Cir. 2011); 
United States V. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009); United States V. Darway, 
255 F. App'x 68, 70-72 (6th Cir. 2007); United States V. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104, 
1109-10 (10th Cir. 2007); United States V. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 875-76 (7th Cir. 
2007); United States V. Griffin, 482 F.3d 1008, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 2007); United 
States V. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 2005); United States V. Rogers, 
666 F. Supp. 2d 148, 150-52 (D. Me. 2009); United States v. Abraham, No. CR NO. 
05-344, 2006 WL 3052702, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2006). 
156 See 624 F.3d 592, 595, 611 (3d Cir. 2010). 
157 [d. at 595-96. 
158 [d. at 596, 598-99. 
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line, and involving no production or distribution other than 
noncommercial bartering," notwithstanding the defendant's 
guilty plea on the transporting and receiving counts. 159 
2. Distribution as Sentencing Factor 
The category collapse among the child pornography offenses 
is striking when we look at the courts' struggle with the meaning 
of the enhancement variables, particularly when images are 
distributed through file-sharing programs. From the outset, the 
Guidelines included an increase to the base level applicable to 
trafficking offenses if an image was distributed.160 It later 
distinguished between distributing in exchange for money or 
other "things of value" and distributing without any gain. 161 
Courts have interpreted the phrase "thing of value" to mean 
pornographic images a person actively trades over a peer-to-peer 
network. 162 Even if the person only downloads images, he can 
meet the "thing of value" distribution enhancement if he knows 
others have access to his images through the shared network.163 
Merely getting faster download speeds, a crucial design function 
of a peer-to-peer network, also constitutes a "thing of value."164 
Thus, a number of courts held that using a peer-to-peer network 
warrants a per se five-level distribution enhancement. 165 Other 
courts apply only a lesser two-level enhancement when a 
defendant uses a peer-to-peer network. 166 One court 
159 Id. at 598 n.1. 
160 See 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 10. 
161 See id. at 33-35 (internal quotation marks ommitted); see also U.S. 
SENTENCING GmDELINES MANuAL § 2G2.2(b)(3) (2013). Distribution for pecuniary 
gain and for "receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for 
pecuniary gain" merits a five-level increase, and distribution for other reasons 
merits a two-level increase. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). The Guidelines also called for a five-
level increase if the distribution was to a minor and a seven-level increase if it was 
to a minor with the intent to have the minor engage in prohibited sexual activity. Id. 
§ 2G2.2(b)(3). 
162 See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 482 F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks ommitted); United States v. McVey, 476 F. Supp. 2d 560, 
563 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
163 See United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d 921,925 (8th Cir. 2010). 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See, e.g., United States v. Dodd, 598 F.3d 449,451-52 (8th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Estey, 595 F.3d 836, 844 (8th Cir. 2010). 
1040 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1013 
acknowledged either enhancement could apply-a troubling 
overlap because there appears to be no rhyme or reason to the 
choice. 167 
To rectify the problem, some courts have cut back on a per se 
approach and have ruled the issue should be decided on a case-
by-case basis.168 This solution has created its own issues because 
courts have allowed the enhancement with little direct proof of 
knowing distribution. Some courts have inferred knowledge 
based on the level of sophistication of the computer user.169 
Most troubling is judicial use of a "willful blindness" 
standard to impose the distribution enhancement. For example, 
in 2010, the Eighth Circuit upheld a finding that the defendant's 
conduct warranted a distribution enhancement when he 
downloaded images onto Limewire, a peer-to-peer program.170 
The court rejected the defendant's contention that he did not 
know his computer was equipped to distribute.17l It reasoned 
that "the purpose of a file sharing program is to share, in other 
words, to distribute. Absent concrete evidence of ignorance-
evidence that is needed because ignorance is entirely 
counterintuitive-a fact-finder may reasonably infer that the 
defendant knowingly employed a file sharing program for its 
intended purpose."I72 The implications of this court's reasoning 
cannot be understated. A willful blindness standard could 
drastically increase a person's punishment and, in today's age, 
may impact every user of a peer-to-peer program. Furthermore, 
as new sharing platforms are created, more and more individuals 
will be sharing information, whether they are aware or not.173 
Criminality of such conduct must depend on more than a legal 
tool such as willful blindness. 
167 See Estey, 595 F.3d at 843. 
168 See id. at 843-44; Dodd, 598 F.3d at 451. 
169 See, e.g., United States v. Bastian, 603 F.3d 460,466 (8th Cir. 2010). 
170 See Dodd, 598 F.3d at 451-52. Ai; there was no evidence that defendant 
received anything of value to warrant the five-level enhancement, the government 
sought a two-level enhancement. Id. at 451. 
171 See id. at 451-52. 
172 Id. at 452; accord United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d 921, 932 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(finding that defendant established actual ignorance); cf. United States v. DuFran, 
430 F. App'x 855, 857-58 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 
335 (4th Cir. 2009). 
173 See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, courts are holding that defendants who use file-
sharing programs are ineligible for any decrease in the base level 
offense originally passed by the Commission for simple receipt 
offenses with no proof of distribution.174 For example, in 2011, 
the Seventh Circuit noted it would be frivolous for a defendant 
who used a file-sharing program to argue for a two-level 
decrease. 175 As the use of peer-to-peer networks continues to 
grow, it will cause a de facto elimination of this decrease. 
As courts increasingly differ on what actions qualify for 
upward and downward sentence adjustments when a person uses 
a peer-to-peer network to obtain child pornography, the courts' 
actions are in danger of appearing arbitrary. For example, when 
calculating the sentence for a person convicted of possession, 
receipt, and distribution of child pornography via a peer-to-peer 
network, the sentencing court would have to use different base 
levels for each offense, and, in addition to other enhancement 
calculations, decide the applicability of the distribution 
sentencing factor, with the following possibilities: decrease by 
two, increase by two, or increase by five. Such discretion is 
arbitrary when it is not based on a reasoned calculation of the 
harm a defendant has inflicted, but rather on outmoded 
categories of offenses. 
c. Transporting us. Possessing 
Peer-to-peer file-sharing has also resulted in defendants 
being charged with transporting child pornography when they 
leave their network open. In a case virtually indistinguishable 
from Shaffer,176 prosecutors chose to charge a defendant with 
transporting child pornography rather than distributing it.177 
The same use of a peer-to-peer network now exposes a defendant 
to charges of transporting, distributing, receiving, and possessing 
child pornography. 
As technology evolves, so too should the law. We should not 
have de facto and unintentional changes in offenses and 
sentences. For example, when the Commission combined the 
trafficking and possessing Guidelines, it exposed possessors to 
distribution enhancements because of sharing networks. In 
174 See 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 48. 
175 United States v. Armes, 415 F. App'x 729,730 (7th Cir. 2011). 
176 472 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2007). 
177 United States v. Schade, 318 F. App'x 91, 93 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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addition, the same network use has essentially eliminated the 
two-level receiving decrease. As the Commission moves forward 
with its review, it must assess whether these changes were 
intentional and whether they result in appropriate sentences. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Political implications for members of Congress should they 
appear to be soft on child pornographers means statutory 
changes may be difficult to enact; nevertheless, these 
recommendations are made with a view of at least helping to 
shape a discussion of these issues. Employing a harm principle 
gives a starting point for addressing current offenses and 
sentencing controversies. As the landmark child pornography 
cases have stated repeatedly, users of child pornography cause 
the depicted child to be shamed and humiliated by the knowledge 
people are looking at the images of the child being abused.178 
This humiliation is exacerbated by the Internet. As one 
court described, "[T]he child victims suffer not only from the 
initial physical sexual abuse of their tormentors, but also from 
the knowledge that their degradation will be repeatedly viewed 
electronically into near perpetuity by a large audience."179 
When adult abuse survivors become aware that the images 
of them as children are circulating on the Internet, they become 
even more mistrustful of people and have more of a sense of 
helplessness and hopelessness.18o As one psychologist explained, 
"In childhood, they knew that they were physically invaded and 
they couldn't stop it. As adults, they know they're visually 
invaded and they can't stop it .... So, knowing that [the images 
are] out there just deepens the pathology that they're already 
suffering from."181 
Beyond psychological injury, a more fundamental harm is 
suffered. Even if the child was unaware the image was 
circulated, those who trade in and view child pornography harm 
178 See supra notes 16-19, 29 and accompanying text. Other harms are that 
users contribute to the market for child pornography that could lead to abuse of 
additional children, and that children can be "groomed" into permitting acts of abuse 
against them if they see images and perceive that the behavior is acceptable. See 
generally Rogers, supra note 13. 
179 United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 357 (E.D.NY. 2011); see also New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-60 (1982). 
180 C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 382. 
181 [d. 
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the child's inherent right not to be viewed in this fashion. There 
is harm each and every time an image is circulated. From where 
does this human dignity right derive? This right goes beyond 
tort theories on invasion of privacy.182 We can look to more 
analogous situations for answers. 
A. The Fundamental Harm in Images 
Images are so powerful that, in diverse settings, special rules 
apply to them. For example, the Geneva Convention requires 
that prisoners of war ("POWs") be treated humanely, and this 
includes banning photographs of them that subject them to 
humiliation or public curiosity.183 Some courts have construed 
the term "public curiosity" to ban photographs that are released 
for the purpose of humiliating those depicted.184 Under Articles 
13 and 14 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions III Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, POWs are also "entitled in all 
circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour."185 
Even non-POWs, or so-called enemy combatants, are entitled to 
protection against "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
182 The issue of restitution to victims from pornographers under 
18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012), the mandatory restitution statute, has been the 
subject of recent court decisions and has split circuit courts. Some circuit courts have 
held that possessors are too remote to be the proximate cause of a victim's injury and 
therefore no damages are recoverable. See, e.g., United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 
147, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2011). Others have held that the restitution statute has only a 
limited proximity requirement. See, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190, 198 (5th 
Cir. 2011), affd in part and vacated in part, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012). The 
impact of these cases on the current issue is doubtful as they deal with 
remuneration; criminal culpability dependent on outmoded statutory classifications 
raises wholly separate issues. While on the surface one might argue that if a 
possessor is not liable for damages, then he should not be criminally liable, the 
Supreme Court has long laid to rest the constitutionality of punishing possessors. 
See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111-14 (1990). In fact, even in Aumais, the court 
upheld the possessor's sentence of 121 months. Aumais, 656 F.3d at 156-57. 
183 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 13, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.s.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 
75 U.N.T.s. 287. See generally Robert Cryer, The Fine Art of Friendship: Jus In Bello 
in Afghanistan, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 37, 73-76 (2002); Noel Whitty, Soldier 
Photography of Detainee Abuse in Iraq: Digital Technology, Human Rights and the 
Death of Baha Mousa, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 689, 691 (2010). 
184 ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 90 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated on other 
grounds, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009). 
185 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra 
note 183, art. 14. 
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humiliating and degrading treatment."186 One need only think of 
the disgrace over the Abu Ghraib incident to see the impact of 
photographs. It was not just the humiliating treatment itself; it 
was the taking and dissemination of photographs of the 
humiliation that was contemptible.187 The same criticism was 
made following the release of photographs of Saddam Hussein 
after his capture.188 
Death scene and autopsy photographs are also subject to 
dissemination restrictions. In National Archives and Records 
Administration v. Favish,189 the Supreme Court ruled that 
families are entitled to limit disclosure of death-scene images of 
their loved ones.190 The case involved death-scene photographs of 
Vincent Foster, Jr., deputy counsel to President Clinton, and the 
respondent's Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request for the 
photos. In denying the FOIA request, the Court noted FOIA 
Exemption 7(C) excuses from disclosure information compiled by 
law enforcement if its production "could reasonably be expected 
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 191 
Foster's sister explained her opposition to the release of the 
photos: "[I] was horrified and devastated by [a] photograph 
[already] leaked to the press. [E]very time I see it, ... I have 
nightmares and heart-pounding insomnia as I visualize how he 
must have spent his last few minutes and seconds of his life."192 
She opposed the disclosure of the disputed pictures because 
186 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 
art. 75(2)(b), June 8, 1977, 16 LL.M. 1391, 1423. See generally Cryer, supra note 183. 
187 See Cryer, supra note 183, at 74 n.200 ("[Tlhe reference is, strictly speaking 
to the customary concomitant of art. 75, as the US is not bound by the Protocol, 
having signed, but not ratified it."); Pamela Hess, Geneva Convention Prohibits 
Filming POWs, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Mar. 23, 2003), http://www.upi.com/Business_ 
N ews/Security-Industry/2003/03/23/Geneva -Convention -prohibits-filming-POW sf 
UPI -802610484603841. 
188 Josh White & Ellen Knickmeyer, U.S. Officials Condemn Hussein Photos; 
Investigation Begun After British Tabloid Publishes Pictures of Iraqi in Custody, 
WASH. POST, May 21, 2005, at A13. 
189 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
190 Clay Calvert, Salvaging Privacy & Tranquility from the Wreckage: Images of 
Death, Emotions of Distress & Remedies of Tort in the Age of the Internet, 2010 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 311, 312; see also Favish, 541 U.S. at 170. 
191 Favish, 541 U.S. at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
192 Id. at 167 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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"[u]ndoubtedly, the photographs would be placed on the Internet 
for world consumption" and would renew media interest in her 
brother's death. 193 
The Court agreed that FOIA exemption 7(C) extended 
beyond the person depicted to his family members and banned 
release of the images, unless the person requesting the 
information establishes a significant public interest in the 
information sufficient to override the family's privacy interest in 
the images.194 It found that the respondent failed to meet this 
burden.195 Tort law also limits dissemination of non-newsworthy 
death and autopsy images.196 They are deemed to be inherently 
humiliating and distressful for the family and can subject the 
releasers to damages.197 
Other courts ban the release of private information even if 
identities are protected. In Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. 
Ashcroft, the government sought medical records of patients who 
received late-term abortions to aid the government's 
constitutional challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 
2003.198 In rejecting the government's demand, the Seventh 
Circuit ruled it would be an invasion of the privacy rights of 
anonymous patients.199 The court's reasoning is particularly 
relevant to the victims of child pornography: 
Imagine if nude pictures of a woman, uploaded to the Internet 
without her consent though without identifying her by name, 
were downloaded in a foreign country by people who will never 
meet her. She would still feel that her privacy had been 
invaded. The revelation of the intimate details contained in the 
record of a late-term abortion may inflict a similar wound.20o 
Dissemination of images for no worthy purpose inflicts harm 
on the depicted person. The absolute lack of any worthy; reason 
to trade in child pornography establishes the inherent harm to 
the dignity of the child depicted. The person inflicting the abuse 
captured in a pornographic image is obviously deserving of 
193 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
194 Id. at 172. 
195 Id. at 175. See generally Calvert, supra note 190. 
196 Calvert, supra note 190, at 313. 
197 See, e.g., Catsouras v. Dep't of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 
357 (Ct. App. 2010), modified, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 253 (Ct. App. 2010). 
198 362 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). 
199 Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 929. 
200 Id. 
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substantial punishment as a child molester. The producer of the 
image is guilty of documenting the infliction of sexual abuse. The 
harm that others further down the chain inflict lacks physicality, 
but they too inflict distinct, actual harm on the child whose 
image is disseminated and collected. 
B. Statutory and Guideline Changes 
Under current federal law, producers are punished 
separately and most severely.201 Others in the pornography 
network are differentiated by activity,202 and the law treats 
attempts to commit prohibited offenses equally to the completed 
offenses.203 As explained in Part III, however, when a person 
uses file-sharing technology, the categories of prohibited 
activities involving child pornography no longer reflect crisply 
defined actions. Thus, transporters, distributors, and possessors 
often are one and the same, engaging in identical activity. We 
can define them as "traders." 
In place of the current statutory scheme, a more valid 
delineation would be among producers, traders, and seekers of 
child pornography. Since it is the producer who usually inflicts 
the most harm, he should have the most severe sentence; traders 
also harm the child, but typically to a lesser degree because they 
are not involved in any direct sexual abuse of a child. One 
possibility is that all activities involving the trading of child 
pornography have the same statutory base sentence. This is in 
keeping with fundamental harm theory because the depicted 
children are damaged by any and all proliferation of their 
images. Starting at the same base level, the Commission could 
then establish enhancements or departures to distinguish among 
the traders and their individual culpability. For example, one 
suggestion is that the first person to upload images be punished 
more severely than later downloaders.204 Similarly, one who runs 
a chat room or bulletin board is more culpable than those who 
visit those sites. 
201 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012) (minimum fifteen year, maximum thirty year 
sentence). 
202 Id. § 2252A. 
203 Id. §§ 2251(e), 2252A(b)(1), 2252A(b)(2). 
204 Exum, supra note 48, at 39. 
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A caveat to placing all traders in the same base category is 
that it should not automatically increase sentences for 
possessors-which would occur if the current divisions between 
distributors, receivers, and possessors are made into one. 
Instead, Congress needs to reexamine the current mandatory 
sentence structure against the backdrop of the blurring of 
offenses that exists with current technology.205 
Those who have not yet obtained images should be punished 
lesser still since they have not yet inflicted harm. 206 This 
suggestion is in keeping with the basic tenet of attempt laws that 
do not punish attempts as severely as completed crimes.207 Thus, 
the statutes which now contain the same punishment for those 
attempting to commit child pornography could be parsed so the 
attempt is punished at a lower level. The attempts are more 
comparable to the child pornography crimes of pandering and 
belong more appropriately grouped together.208 
As previously discussed in Part III, many scholars and 
judges have criticized the Guideline enhancement for number of 
images possessed.209 Troy Stabenow has argued that punishing a 
defendant based on the number of images he or she has 
accumulated is akin to punishing a habitual marijuana smoker 
for every marijuana cigarette he or she has smoked over the past 
several years.210 This analogy is wrong in that it does not 
acknowledge the offender has violated each child's right not to be 
viewed in a pornographic image. The collection continues to 
exist, unlike the dissipated marijuana, and the defendant who 
knowingly accesses large amounts of child pornography is 
harming large numbers of children. A better approach suggested 
by the Sentencing Commission would focus on the extent to 
which an offender is involved in online child pornography 
205 Even the Justice Department agrees. See Wroblewski, supra note 72, at 3-6. 
206 See generally Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting 
Operations and Attempt Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 479-83 (2004). 
207 See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 473-74 
(2000); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 646--47 (5th ed. 2010). 
208 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B). In keeping with the thesis of this Article, since 
the pandering offense is an inchoate crime, Congress should re-examine its sentence, 
which is currently a mandatory five-year minimum. Id. § 2252A(b)(1). 
209 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
210 Jesse P. Basbaum, Note, Inequitable Sentencing for Possession of Child 
Pornography: A Failure To Distinguish Voyeurs from Pederasts, 61 HAsTINGS L.J. 
1281, 1301 n.163 (2010) (describing a telephone Interview with Troy Stabenow, 
Assistant Federal Public Defender on January 13, 2010). 
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communities.211 In addition, the use-of-computer enhancement 
does not adequately relate to the harm suffered by the child 
depicted and should be eliminated.212 
The need to reform the laws becomes more urgent as 
technology continues its unabated growth. For example, cloud 
computing is becoming more and more popular.213 Shared file 
functions that are available may make cloud computing 
analogous to peer-to-peer networking, but on a much larger 
platform. Given this technology, a person who collects child 
pornography by storing it on a cloud server may also be a 
distributer of the image by virtue of the sharing function of his 
cloud files. 214 Yet, since the images are stored on a remote server, 
some have questioned whether and who possesses them.215 
Similarly, as wireless routers are now increasingly used to 
access the Internet, a person who fails to lock his router with a 
password could potentially be charged if his router is used by 
someone to transmit child pornography.216 The analogy would be 
to peer-to-peer file sharers who fail to opt out of the sharing 
function. Taken to its logical extreme, the same willful blindness 
standard the courts have used in the file-sharing cases could 
apply to owners of unprotected routers.217 Of course, there is a 
difference in that a third person is hacking into an unprotected 
wireless network, as opposed to being part of a file-sharing 
network, but one who knows and fails to protect his router from 
unauthorized access is leaving himself open to charges. 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
212 See supra text accompanying note 77; supra note 178. 
213 See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. 
214 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection 
of the First Amendment Should Be More Like That of the Fourth, 62 HAsTINGS L.J. 
357,364 (2010). 
215 Id. 
216 See Jean-Loup Richet, FBI Child Porn Raid a Strong Argument for Locking 
Down WiFi Networks, INFO. SYSTEMS RES. BLOG (June 2, 2011), 
http://www.information-systems-research.comlblog/201lJ06/02lfbi-child-porn-raid-a-
strong-argument-for-Iocking-down-wifi-networks. No charges were brought against 
the unwitting host. Id. 
217 Cf Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2068-69 (2011) 
(discussing willful blindness standard applied in patent infringement case). There is 
a difference in that a person is hacking into an unprotected wireless network, as 
opposed to being part of a file-sharing network, but whether this is legally 
significant is untested as yet. 
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CONCLUSION 
Fears that the Internet would be a boon to child 
pornographers have been realized as the number of images 
permanently circulating in cyberspace has ballooned into the 
millions. Yet, to be effective in punishing this flood, the law must 
accurately delineate the culpable conduct. The divisions among 
traders of child pornography are no longer accurate; and, 
therefore, the differentials in punishment have lost their 
underpinnings. The current sentencing controversy surrounding 
child pornographers is merely the tip of the iceberg of the larger 
need to revamp the offenses themselves. 
Optimally, Congress should revise the child pornography 
statutes to reflect technology; however, most likely this is 
politically unfeasible. Nevertheless, failure to act will allow the 
current debate to harden positions with negative consequences. 
Harsh sentences, such as life imprisonment for possession of 
child pornography, as one court imposed recently, are 
counterproductive to the ostensible rationale for punishment.218 
Rather than deterring the prohibited activity, it causes some to 
question the validity of the offense itself or minimize its gravity. 
At the other extreme, to equate the harm inflicted by sexual 
predators in producing pornographic images of children, with 
that of downstream traders, is equally ineffective. The proposed 
framework, at the very least, may allow judges to properly tailor 
punishments and give the Commission guidance in revamping its 
Guidelines. 
218 Erica Goode, Life Sentence for Possession of Child Pornography Spurs Debate 
over Severity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at A9. 
